ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER ... comments called "personal view"

CIA head faults plans for MX

By CHARLES W. CORDORY Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington-Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, registered strong objection at a White House meeting this week to the latest plans for building MX intercontinental missiles and deploying them in "race track" patterns in Western states, authoritative sources disclosed yesterday.

Contrary to earlier reports from administration sources that a consensus had been reached, Admiral Turner raised exceptions to the scheme, which goes to the heart of United States strategic nuclear force planning.

If the admiral, now retired from the Navy, had his way, the sources said, the U.S. would gradually do away with landbased missiles and concentrate on upgrading missile-launching submarine fleets and retaining bomber forces. It would have two kinds of nuclear forces instead of the present "triad."

meeting he attended with Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security assistant, and Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss the MX deployment plan with Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense.

That plan, the latest of several and the one Mr. Brown is expected to propose to President Carter in about two weeks, calls for shunting 200 missiles among 4,600 horizontal shelters. The shelters would be arranged in closed loops, or race track fashion, so that the missiles could be kept mobile among them and thus protected against a Soviet strike.

The plan is said to have answered political and environmental objections in the states concerned, mainly Utah and Nevada, with possibilities of deployment also in

Arizona and New Mexico. Admiral Turner's objections were viewed by authorities as somewhat mystifying in view of the reported position already taken by his advisers at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The ClA staff position, it was said, is that the MX missiles could be counted by Soviet reconnaissance satellites - as required by the SALT II treaty-and could be regarded as highly "survivable" under attack, based on estimates of Russian nuclear capabilities.

The admiral's reasons for dissent could not be determined, given his own silence on the matter, but critics immediately ascribed a Navy bias to them-in brief, a view that the Navy should take over the dominant nuclear deterrent role. The authoritative sources said he argued his case as the personal view of a military man.

This was but the latest instance of a publicly reported Turner view causing some embarrassment to Carter administration defense planners. He was recently held to have told the Senate Intelligence Committee the Russians could produce five new missiles under the SALT treaty, whereas the public version had been that only one new type was allowed.

Mr. Brown later explained in SALT hearings that any, besides the one, would have to be so closely related in dimensions to present types that they would be a waste of money, in his opinion.

As with the present case of the MX, Admiral Turner offered no public statement on the Soviet missile question.

President Carter made a basic decision in the first week of June to proceed with the development of the MX, a rocket weighing 190,000 pounds and carrying 10 generately targeted warheads. 🛝